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Introduction
1 The question we raise is why entrepreneurs arise and voluntarily organize larger groups
in local areas. This is an important question because voluntary collective good provision
in  a  local  area  enhances  economic  growth and alleviates  poverty.  This  question has
challenged social sciences for more than three decades. The extreme complexity of this
question has motivated us to choose an economic approach. Why? To establish a simple
and parsimonious starting point for our discussions. In other words, we start by assuming
that  group  action  is  economically  rational.  As  shown in  the  next  two  sections,  this
approach is forcefully parsimonious. We know from Mancur Olson’s seminal work, The
Logic of Collective Action (1965), that it does not pay an individual to provide collective
goods voluntarily, if the individual economic gain from doing this is negative (see also
Mueller,  1989  and  Svendsen  G.T.,  1998).  Thus,  as  argued  in  the  section  called
“Entrepreneurship”, it does not pay an individual in larger groups to act as entrepreneur
and facilitate local collective action, because individual costs from doing so are higher
than the individual benefits from acting. Still, everyday observations and the empirical
evidence presented in the section on “Entrepreneurs in rural Denmark 1800-1900” tell us
that larger groups do organize and that entrepreneurs in the form of group leaders do
exist. How can this paradox be explained? Why do we find entrepreneurship within larger
groups? This paradox shows that other than economic incentives are important to the
economic development of local areas and there is a strong need in literature to fill this
gap (see Green and Shapiro, 1994). 
2 Cross-disciplinary human science research has approached this problem focusing on the
social aspects of the economic transactions (Granovetter, 1985; Coleman, 1994). However,
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in our opinion, the overall theoretical framework of such investigations could be further
strengthened by  introducing  the  concept  of  social  capital.  In  contrast  to  conceptual
cousins such as micro-oriented terms as “network ” and “entrepreneurship” (to which
social capital should be regarded as a supplement and not a replacement), the notion of
social capital can be applied – and has been applied – at both micro-, meso- and macro-
levels.  This  means  that  the  possibility  for  consistent  trans-national  comparisons  is
enhanced. Moreover, as sociologist James Coleman (1994, p. 175) has argued, social capital
is a fruitful term to use, because it closely links the economists’ word “capital” to the
social scientists’ key-notion “social” – a point we shall return to. In this way, by including
in this very direct way both the economic and cultural sphere, social capital promotes a
holistic understanding of collective goods provision processes. 
3 Our contribution is precisely to suggest that the presence of a social glue in the form of
social capital – defined as regular face-to-face, co-operative relations – may explain the
paradox of collective good provision (see Coleman, 1988a and Putnam, 1993a, 2000). As we
argue  below,  social  capital  may  be  built  locally  as  an  outcome  of  innovations  in
organization (“the rules of the game”) and then foster entrepreneurship, which again
may lubricate collective action. This theory seems to be confirmed by empirical evidence
from rural Denmark 1800-1900. 
 
Collective good provision
4 Let  us first  define what we mean by a “collective good”.  The relevant decisions and
consequences in the local area from having entrepreneurs initiating collective actions are
“collective” or “public” goods. 
5 A pure public good is traditionally defined by two conditions. First,  non-excludability
which means that exclusion from consuming the good is not feasible. It is not necessary
that  exclusion  should  be  technically  impossible,  only  that  it  is  uneconomic.  Second,
jointness of supply, that is, making a good available to one individual means that it can be
supplied to others as well. There is no crowding effect. This definition is consistent with
Samuelson’s pure collective good which is a good such that additional consumption of it
by one individual does not diminish the amount available to others (Samuelson, 1954, p. 
387. See also Sandler, 1992; Mueller, 1989 and Hardin, 1982). 
6 The abatement of global warming is a rare example of a pure public good because it
fulfills both conditions. It is not possible to exclude anyone from enjoying the benefits of
avoiding the greenhouse effect  and this  abatement is  independent  of  the number of
people benefitting from it. So, no matter the number of world population, everybody will
benefit from avoiding a global catastrophe. International security is another example. 
7 However, it is not easy to think of other pure public goods. First, people may be excluded,
for example from living in an area with less acid rain or from using a highway.  For
example, when exclusion is possible – as passing a bridge or producing electricity – then
the supply may just as well be undertaken by private firms as by the public, i.e. the state.
Second, if too many people consume it (crowding), it will alter what is left, for example
“free land” in the Wild West, police and court systems, fire protection, swimming-pools.
Imagine for  example the ancient  case of  a  castle  wall  where everybody living inside
cannot be excluded from the collective good of protection against roving banditry. There
is only room for a certain number of people inside the walls. However, this and other
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“impurities” still represent common goals and are similar to pure public goods over some
range. In the literature, such non-excludable goods are called either common, public or
collective goods. Here, we prefer the term “collective good” for two reasons. First, as a
term where  jointness  is  not  a  necessary  attribute  of  a  collective  good.  Collective  or
common simply means that no one in the group is excluded from the benefit. So only the
first condition of non-excludability is met. Second, by using this term, we also avoid any
confusion, as the term “public” seems to suggest, that only the state can provide the
good. However, private goods are often provided collectively for non-economic reasons.
Well  known  cases  are  those  of  health  services,  libraries,  bus  services,  electricity,
telecommunication or railways. Such non-collective goods (which are both excludable
and without jointness of supply) can always be provided by private enterprise.
8 Collective action simply means group action. It is relevant in our context whenever two
or more individuals are involved, and it serves the interests of the individual better than
individual action. Any collective action will fundamentally provide an inseparable benefit
for any member of the group. So, in its most abstract sense, collective action is to be
found whenever the grouping of two or more individuals is needed for accomplishing a
goal. With this wider definition, all collective goods are covered. The achievement of any
common goal (in relation to a specific group) in a local area means that a collective good
has been provided for all members in that group. In the section called “Social capital ”,
we return to actual examples of collective good provision in rural Denmark due to the
work of local entrepreneurs. 
 
Entrepreneurship
9 However,  it  does  not  follow  that  perfect  consensus,  both  about  the  desire  for  the
collective good and the most efficient means of getting it, will always bring about the
achievement  of  group  goal.  Mancur  Olson’s  seminal  contribution  from  1965  is  that
rational, individual behaviour does not lead to rational group behaviour. Even if the total
benefits by far exceed total costs for achieving a common goal, it does not logically follow
that collective action takes place. 
10 This  point  broke  with  traditional  group  theory  which  was  based  on  the  degree  of
consensus. An individual will voluntarily act in support of common group interests and
values as a logical consequence from the widely accepted premise of rational self-interest.
Exceptions to this rule occur when the leadership is ignoring the group interests and, due
to asymmetrical information (leaders know more than the rest of the group members), is
serving other ends (Olson, 1965, p. 5). 
11 In  other  words,  prior  to  Olson  (1965),  groups  were  simply  viewed  as  voluntary
organizations furthering their common interests. But this is not so, says Olson. Rational
individual behaviour does not lead to rational group behaviour! Olson formulates it as
follows: 
(..)  rational,  self-interested individuals  will  not  act  to  achieve  their  common or
group interests [1965, p.2] 
12 This  means  that  even though the  aggregate  gains  that  a  local  group attains  from a
collective  good  greatly  exceed  the  total  costs  of  that  action  (and  thereby  enhances
prosperity), it does not follow that the action will occur: Individual rationality does not
lead to collective rationality. David Hume is the first to treat the collective (public) choice
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problem in an academic way. In his A Treatise of Human Nature from 1739 he writes that
when men have protected themselves against each other’s weaknesses and passions – by
the execution and decision of justice – they “begin to taste at ease the sweets of society
and mutual assistance” (Hume, 1984, p. 589). He exemplifies this situation by looking at
two farmers that may agree to drain a swamp which they own in common. They know
each other’s mind, and failing means abandoning the project.  Hume then went on to
observe that it is indeed impossible that a thousand persons should agree on any such
action, “it being difficult for them to concert so complicated a design, and still  more
difficult for them to execute it; while each seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble
and expense, and would lay the whole burden on others” (Hume, 1984, p. 590). 
13 This brings us back to Mancur Olson’s main point that individual rationality does not
necessarily lead to collective rationality. Why is it so? Let us take a closer look at the
distribution of costs and benefits in a group. Say that the total value of draining the
swamp is  $1  million to  the  group of  farmers,  and that  the  total  cost  of  drainage is
$100,000. Further assume that the value of drainage, if provided, would be shared equally
among all the members. 
14 If the group has 2 farmers, they share the total benefit equally and each member will
experience a benefit valued at $500,000. Since each individual member’s net benefit from
providing the good is positive in this case ($400,000), the good will now be provided even
in the absence of organization. If the group has 1,000 farmers, each farmer would receive
an individual gain of $1,000. Although the group as a whole would stand to get benefits
worth ten times the amount of money invested in draining the swamp, the net benefit to
any individual member who chooses to provide the good on his or her own is clearly
negative.  In  the  absence  of  organization,  the  collective  good  will  therefore  not  be
provided. As such, the link between individual rationality and group rationality depends
on  the  individual  net  benefit  from  contributing  to  the  collective  good.  Table  1
resummarizes this logic. 
 
Table 1. Collective Good Provision.
15 In other words, Olson (1965) suggests that in the small group of two farmers, both will act
as entrepreneurs and will voluntarily provide the collective good on their own, because
they both get a positive economic net gain from doing so. In contrast, in the larger group
of 1,000 farmers no one will act as entrepreneur on their own and start organizing the
group, reaping the aggregated economic benefits for the group (or local society) as a
whole, because the economic net gain is clearly negative. Although mobilization of these
larger  groups  is  difficult  and takes  time,  it  happens.  Olson explains  the  presence  of
entrepreneurs and group mobilization in larger groups by the phenomenon of chance.
Only when the right leadership and the right circumstances are present, a group may
develop  (Olson,  1982).  E.g.,  he  gives  an  illustrative  example  of  a  young  union
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entrepreneur, Jimmy Hoffa. Hoffa was one of the workers in an unorganized warehouse in
Detroit. On a hot summer day, a large shipment of strawberries – that would soon spoil –
arrived. Hoffa then persuaded his co-workers to strike. The employer found it better to
accept Hoffa’s demands than to lose his perishable cargo (Olson, 1982, p. 38). However,
this  ad hoc explanation offered by Olson is  clearly unsatisfactory,  thus leading us to
alternative explanations. 
 
Networks, entrepreneurship and life-modes
16 The  behavioural  assumption  underlying  Mancur  Olson’s  work  and  that  of  other
economists is that man will pursue private interests and not those of the public or the
common. The assumption about human behaviour is as such harsh and simple: Only self-
interest  matters!  No  moral  is  involved  and  each  agent  will  unscrupulously  try  to
maximize his own net benefits. For example, moral and ideology play no role. As Deng
Xiaoping once put it: It does not matter what colour the cat is, as long as it can catch the
mice! Thus, concerning income, the rational preference of man is to maximize private
income in monetary terms and,  next,  to  purchase a  number of  ranked goods in the
market. In this way, economists focus on the agent with given preferences.
17 In contrast, we will view preferences as unstable, because social interaction may create
norms and values which heavily guide the actions of the individuals so that individual
action is typically reproduced due to the given structure.
18 This is reflected in the so-called F-connection (family,  friends,  and firms),  which was
introduced by economist Yoram Ben-Porath (1930), as well as in sociologist Granovetter’s
(1985, 1995) notion of the “embeddedness” of economic transaction sin differing cultural
contexts. For example, in an American context, Granovetter has shown that getting a job
normally requires that the actor uses his or her social network in the form of friends,
acquaintances and the like. In this way, Granovetter explains, getting a job depends more
on using the resource of “weak ties” rather than that of “strong ties”, that is, kinship
based relations (1973, 1974).
19 Economist Bengt Johannisson’s research on the networking of community entrepreneurs
closely  links  to  Granovetter’s  findings  (see  for  example 1987,  1989,  1997).Here,  the
“network  metaphor”  is  used  to  bridge  between “social  and  economic  dimensions  of
human conduct”, while “entrepreneurship” is regarded as “an act of creation” and “small
business as a way of life, that is, as phenomena beyond rational economic behaviour”
(Johannisson and Mønsted, 1997, p.109). In this way, Johannisson and Nilsson (1989, p. 18)
has  documented  that,  in  contrast  to  traditional  entrepreneurs  that  “reorganize
resources”,  entrepreneurs  networking  in  local  communities  (i.e.,  “contextual”
entrepreneurs)“reorganize values”.
20 Generally,  a  lot  of  research  in  the  Scandinavian  countries  applies  a  socioeconomic
approach, aiming to interlink the economic with the non-economic – not in the least in
connection with investigations in networking and entrepreneurship (Johannisson and
Mønsted 1997). Moreover, in the beginning of the 1980s, a group of Danish ethnologists
(Christiansen,  1982;  Møllgaard,  1984;  Højrup,  1983,  1989)  developed  the  concept  of
“lifemode”,  referring to the “totality” of  a practice and a world view belonging to a
distinct  group  (i.e.  Danish  peasants).  For  example,  Thomas  Højrup  (1983,  p.  17)  has
suggested to “construct the concepts of several distinct life-modes, which are thebases
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for [group] practices and ideologies and which place their own distinct demands on social
institutions and social organization as a whole”.
 
Social capital
21 In a similar way, Coleman (1994, p. 175) uses the term “social capital” in an attempt to fill
a “lacuna in social and economic theory”. As has already been mentioned, Coleman (ibid.)
here argues that the two words denote a useful linkage inthat the economics term
“capital”  implies  a  resource  that  facilitates  production,  “but  is  not  consumed  or
otherwise used up in production”, while the social scientists’ notion of “social” refers to
“aspects of social  organization, ordinarily informal relationships,  established for non-
economic purposes, yet with economic consequences” (see also Svendsen and Svendsen,
2000, p. 73; Paldam and Svendsen, 2000; Paldam, 2000). Furthermore, applied to empirical
data Coleman (1988b, p. 388ff, 1988a, p. 116ff.) sees social capital as a public good, that is,
a product that also benefits other persons than the producer himself, including persons
who are unknown to the producer. For example, it can be statistically documented that
the production of  human capital  in schools is  highly facilitated,  when pupils  possess
social capital in the form of strong networks consisting of family, friends and neighbours,
who know each other and meet regularly, thus ensuring shared norms and social control.
This Coleman has termed “closure” (1988b, p. 386ff.)2. At the same time it follows that, if a
key-person  in  the  local  production  of  social  capital  moves  from  a  community  (for
example, a parent of one of the school children), other persons than this person will feel
the losses by the “severance” of closure-based relations(1988b, p. 389).
22 This should confirm the importance of social capital as a collective good – but why the
focus on entrepreneurship and rural communities? Because in local areas people have
rich possibilities of getting to know each other and meet regularly and so prepare the
ground for social  incentives facilitating group action and the realization of collective
goods.  However,  as  has  already  been  stressed,  the  provision  of  collective  goods
necessarily implies that the rural community in question is based on non-excludability or,
in  other  words,  that  the  inhabitants  generally  tend to  pursue “integrating”  and not
“excluding survival strategies” and thus are promoting the spread of social  networks
rather than restricting them so as to include only a circle of privileged group members
(Meert, 2000, p. 328).
23 Recalling the case of the draining of as wamp, this suggestion only holds for larger groups
where social action with most people is possible, such as a local group consisting of 1,000
individuals (like the 1,000 farmers, see Table 1).  Very large groups having millions of
members (for example all citizens in a country) are not fertile ground for the use of social
incentives and thus, of the building of social capital. Therefore, only the focus on larger
groups is relevant when discussing entrepreneurship and social capital in the context of
local areas and poverty alleviation. This focus is also justified in an earlier paper where
we  showed  how  local  dairy  production  in  Denmark  probably  encouraged
entrepreneurship  and  the  initiation  of  larger  local  group  organization  around  this
production (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2000). Note that very large groups without regular
social interaction among most individuals are not relevant in this setting.
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Entrepreneurs in rural Denmark 1800-1900
24 During the 19th century, a broad tradition of civic organization was established in the
Danish  rural  districts.  From  the  beginning  of  the  century,  this  organization  was
institutionalized in the form of associations, so numerous in the last part of the century
as to make the period known as Foreningstiden, “The time of associations”.
25 In the following, we argue that it was the organizational structure behind these
associations in the form of the written rules of the game that led to extended networks
and, ultimately, to stocks of beneficial social capital,  that is,  “bridging social capital”.
Right  up  to  the  1960s,  this  process  again  gave  rise  to  generations  of  entrepreneurs
continuously establishing and maintaining “networks of associations” at local, regional
and  national  levels.  In  this  way,  when  first  established  and  institutionalized  due  to
certain,  organizational  principles,  securing  predictability  and  the  possibility  for
sanctions, social capital was rapidly accumulated in all Danish rural districts, fostering
local entrepreneurs who would guarantee group action and the provision of collective
goods.
 
Association builders: builders of social capital
26 It was not only the increasing number of associations that facilitated the emergence of a
strong, rural civic society, but also the diversity of their functions. Thus, knowledge and
organizational  training were  transmitted through economic  and cultural  associations
ranging from insurance associations, savings banks, production associations, agronomist
and  political  associations  to  youth  associations,  gymnastic  clubs,  rifle  clubs  and
temperance societies – all of them closely related to shared buildings financed and raised
by  the  local  communities  themselves,  such  as  free  schools,  folk  high  schools,  free
churches, teacher training colleges, agricultural colleges, religious meeting houses and
drill-halls. Ultimately, this process led to an extremely active, rural population, taking
care of local and regional political, economic and cultural functions and thus – without
any state interference -gradually improving their own living conditions, which at about
1800 had been extremely poor (Svendsen G.L.H., 2001).
27 At the local level, the historical sources indicate that such civic initiative was primarily
due  to  the  activities  of  certain  individuals  engaged,  as  it  seems,  in  every  single
associational  innovation  in  their  communities.  Obviously,  these  charismatic
entrepreneurs or ildsjæle – “souls of fire”- acted from a blend of economic, idealistic and
purely personal motives, often not realizing that their strong commitment was a public
good, ultimately leading to common benefits for all the members of the local society –
both economically and culturally. As we shall see, an excellent example ere is the men
behind the Danish Co-operative Movement.
28 Moreover,  studying  the  historical  evidence  carefully  makes  it  clear  that  from  the
1840smost  of  these local  entrepreneurs  developed into organizers  of  local  as  well  as
regional networks of associations, that is, specific “associational milieus” consisting of a
variety of associations sharing the same political and/or religious ideology and, typically,
with an overlapping membership.  The regular  face-to-face interaction resulting from
such  a  network  of  associations-  voluntarily  established  and  maintained  by  local
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entrepreneurs – led to a general strengthening of mutual trust and common norms in the
rural districts, thus “lubricating” society to use an expression from Putnam (1993b, p. 2).
29 However,  due  to  major  innovations  in  organization,  association  building  rapidly
increased and finally culminated in a Danish co-operative movement from the mid1860s.
In  this  way,  association  building  turned  into  social  capital  building  fostering
entrepreneurship and the provision of collective goods and, thus, improving material as
well as immaterial life conditions of the Danish rural population. These collective, that is
non-excludable, goods were provided by local entrepreneurs orildsjæle, whose personal,
economic net gains were clearly negative, both compared to the amount of time and
energy spent, but, especially, compared to the benefits they provided their communities
in the form of the strengthening of shared norms and, ultimately, of enhancing economic
growth. This is in accordance with James Coleman, who talks about “underinvestment in
social  capital”  due  to  the  fact  that  “the  actor  or  actors  who generate  social  capital




30 From about  1780,  a  feudal  Denmark  based  on  a  subsistence  economy  was  gradually
transformed  into  a  liberalistic  society  based  on  a  modern  monetary  economy.
Agricultural reforms had made it profitable for landlords to allocate land to peasants,
who in great numbers moved from the villages to their new dwellings. In this way, the
reforms promoted a demographic transition that, evidently, already was initiated in the
18th century.
31 The need to finance such large-scale enclosure of land and the following demographic
transformation immediately led to serious cash-flow problems. Thus, the poor liquidity
among the  peasants  necessitated  that  the  state  as  well  as  landlords,  merchants  and
private persons guaranteed the sums needed. However, as expressed by a famous Danish
historian,  the  peasants  were  often  exploited  by  professional  moneylenders,  charging
“bloody interests” (Hertel, 1917, p. 18).
32 Consequently, landlords and peasants together were increasingly seeking new forms of
economic  co-operation  in  the  rural  districts  in  order  to  secure  economic  and social
stability. In this context, the kingdom’s first credit and savings bank was established in
1810 by Count F. A. Holstein, who, strongly influenced by German philanthropy, adopted
the idea from Prussia (Hertel, 1917, p. 19). Of an equally moralistic character were the
rural  district  savings banks,  established during the 1820s,  inviting the ordinary rural
population to prevent personal calamities by lifelong money saving. During the 1840s,
there was an increase in the number of savings banks and private joint stock companies,
offering the peasants loans at low interests.
33 Even cheaper, however, were the loans offered by the new credit associations from about
1850.  The  latter  introduced  the  idea  of  shared  economic  responsibility  in  the  rural
districts, an organizational strategy which was to become one of the cornerstones in the
founding statutes of the cooperative dairies in the second half of the century.
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The Danish co-operative movement
34 The early philanthropic associations were to form the basis of a regular co-operative
movement within Danish agriculture – a movement, which quickly evolved during the
second  half  of  the  19th  century.  In  this  period,  the  Danish  peasants  established  a
multitude of  co-operative  associations,  ranging from co-operative  wholesale  societies
from 1866, co-operative dairies from 1882, co-operative fodder and fertilizer purchasing
associations from 1883, and co-operative meat packing plants from 1887. The decisive
innovation  consisted  in  the  specific  organizational  structure  of  these  associations,
strongly  promoting  co-operative  networks  of  an  inclusive  nature  and  thus  the
accumulation of beneficial social capital. Right from the beginning, this organizational
structure  was  institutionalized in  the  standard founding statutes  of  the  co-operative
association.
35 The initial idea came from England. In1844, in Rochdale near Manchester, a group of
weavers founded the first co-operative wholesale society in the world, that is, a sales and
purchasing company owned by the members themselves. About twenty years later, two
friends living in the village of Møgeltønder in the southern part of the Jutland peninsula –
Doctor F. F. Ulrikand H. C. Sonne, a priest – discussed the Rochdale principles. Ulrik had
been familiar with these ideas for some time and now he provoked passionate interest
from Sonne (Ravnholt, p. 30). In various ways, these philanthropically minded men were
trying to alleviate the conditions of the poorest part of the population by establishing a
wide range of charitable organizations and institutions in the area (Dollerup, 1966, p.
34ff.).
 
Figure 1. Danish parish savings banks 1865-1914, deposits in million DDK.
Source: Blinkenberg Nielsen, 1950, pp. 172-73
36 During the first part of the 19th century, then, the finance market was to a still lesser
degree dominated by the state and by the philanthropic and liberal-thinking landlords,
thus giving place for financial institutes owned by the peasants themselves. Especially
during the 1850s and 1860s, with the foundation of a great number of local agricultural
savings banks, this tendency became clear. In this way, the rural financial institutes and
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similar peasant owned institutions such as health, cattle and fire assurance associations
should be  seen as  a  basic  element  in  the  process  of  self-organization,  leading to  an
increase in economic and political independence among the population in the Danish
countryside (Bjørn, 1982, p. 97).
37 The competition between rural and urban savings banks should be seen in this light. So
we see that, at the micro level, the majority of the peasants who had been leading figures
behind  the  first  savings  banks,  situated  in  the  provincial  towns,  now  left  the  bank
committees  to  establish  new  local,  rural  savings  banks,  called  parish  savings  banks
(Blinkenberg Nielsen, 1950, p. 11). Thus, these local, parish entrepreneurs or souls of fire,
ildsjæle, taking an active part in the conflict between rural and urban Denmark, promoted
a decentralized co-operative structure in the countryside.
38 However, after the defeat by Prussia in 1864 and the consequent loss of the southern part
of  Jutland,  Ulrik and Sonne,  being glowing patriots,  were forced to leave the region,
though they continued their entrepreneurial activities in close co-operation with other
kindred  spirits.  So,  in  Copenhagen,  Ulrik  started  a building  association  for  shipyard
workers in 1865, while Sonne established the first Danish wholesale society in the small
borough of Thisted in 1866. 
39 Obviously, the great success of this first wholesale society in Denmark was due to Sonne’s
vast insight into the original organizational principles used in the English co-operative
wholesale movement – a knowledge he had obtained partly during several study tours,
partly by reading all  the English literature about the subject he could get.  All  this is
documented in a book, Sonne wrote in 1867, the year after he had founded his wholesale
society  (see  also  Dollerup,  1966,  p.  50).  Drawing  on  practical  experiences  from  the
wholesale society in Thisted, he here propagated the “laws from Rochdale”, that is, the
founding statutes he himself had successfully implemented in a Danish local community
(Sonne, 1867, p. 4ff.). In this way, promoted by key-principles such as allocation of profits
due to the amount of purchases done by the members (§2 and §6),  shared economic
responsibility  (§3),  open membership (§4)  and democratic  decision-  making (§5),  the
purpose  of  the  wholesale  society  in  Thisted  (§1)  is  “in  perfect  accordance  with  the
Rochdale  laws  to  establish  a  foundation  by  subscriptions  voluntarily  paid  by  the
members,  in order to allow them to purchase more profitably the necessities of life”
(Sonne, 1867, p. 5). However, this objects clause Sonne only recognized as a means to
fulfill the overall and “true” purpose, namely on the basis of an alleviation of economic
poverty to “raise the lower, more dependent and suppressed part of the population to a
higher social level, morally as well as intellectually, that is, to a more decent position in
society” (Sonne, 1867, p. 5). 
40 If the founding statutes did not fully lead to this idealist goal – at least, not in Sonne’s
lifetime – they actually did offer an organizational structure apt to increase the material
welfare of the poor majority of the Danish population – not at least in the countryside,
where the peasants followed Sonne’s advice and formed their own wholesale societies to
protect themselves against economic exploitation. In this way, and especially from the
mid-1880s, the number of wholesale associations rapidly increased to approximate 850 by
the turn of the century and – which appears quite remarkable in an international context
– all of them established in local rural communities, apart from a few exceptions (figure
2). 
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Figure 2. Danish wholesale societies 1866-1900.
Source: Christensen, 1985, p. 200
41 However, even more important as it seems, the founding statutes of Sonne’s co-operative
wholesale society were to be widely applicated within the agricultural sector, introducing
important “rules of the game” that would strongly enhance co-operation among Danish
farmers as well. 
42 Especially within the so-called Danish cooperative dairy movement from 1882, the co-
operatively based form of organization was further elaborated, juristically as well as in
practice, to fit the norms and culture of the Danish rural population. It was in the village
of Hjedding near Varde, in the western part of Jutland, that a group of entrepreneur
farmers founded the first cooperative dairy. In his memoirs, dating from 1901, one of the
main promoters of the project, farmer Niels Kristensen, writes the following about the
initial discussions: 
During the negotiations, a general sentiment evolved so as to make preference for
collecting the milk instead of the butter (...). To be able to prepare the milk in one
place,  it  was  necessary  to  build  a  dairy.  This,  however,  gave  rise  to  another
problem, since some of the farmers had no wish to build a dairy with others, while
they consented to selling their  milk to the dairy.  In this  way,  without anybody
really knowing it, the negotiations went in the direction of the realization of that,
as it later on was to become, widespread and magnificent cooperative idea: that
everybody who joined the  dairy  should  be  allocated profits  on the  basis  of  the
amount of milk he delivered [translated from Manøe Hansen, 1972, p. 13].
43 Immediately after this meeting, some of the peasants joined to write the contract of the
association. Overall, their articles reflect all the ideas of Sonne and the English wholesale
society movement, stressing principles such as allocation of profits in proportion to the
amount  of  milk  delivered  by  the  members,  shared  economic  responsibility,  open
membership,  and,  not  least,  democratic  decision-making,  which  here  was  further
specified as “one man one vote” at the yearly general assembly, where all major decisions
regarding the dairy should be taken (for more details, see Svendsen and Svendsen, 2000,
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p. 76ff.). During the next couple of months, the building of the dairy in Hjedding took
place, led by the committee members themselves (Kristensen in Manøe Hansen, 1972, pp.
16-17). And in June 1882, dairy production started. 
44 Less than 10 years after this event, the “Hjedding model” had been spread to every single
corner of the country. Looking at the figures, the economic success appears evident. In
1890,  one  third  of  all  Danish  farmers  delivered  milk  to  one  of  the  roughly  700  co-
operative dairies. Consequently, the Danish export of butter increased from 12.5 million
kg in 1880 to about 90 million at the beginning of the new century, while the export of
milk increased from 200 litres to about 600,000 litres in the same period (Bjørn, 1982, p.
21, 552, 561). 
45 Primarily, this success originated in the organizational structure behind the cooperation,
that is, in the founding statutes of the model dairy of Hjedding. First, all over the country,
such a contract – the written rules of the game – involved an extraordinary compromise
between two, conflicting groups, the well-to-do farmers and the small-holders. Using the
Hjedding model as a concrete tool, these two groups now began to co-operate on equal
terms.  The Hjedding model  made such “impossible” co-operation possible,  exactly by
stressing the shared, economic interest of all farmers. So we understand, why §1 of the
founding statutes from Hjedding in detail advocated this shared interest by focussing on
cash payment to the members in proportion to the amount of milk delivered by each
individual during a certain period of time3.  In particular,  this paragraph satisfied the
well-to-do farmers. Moreover, in order to satisfy the small-holders as well, the statutes
secured democratic decision making (§12). Thus the farmers voted “according to heads
and not according to cows”, as it was formulated. Everybody, high and low, was equal4. 
46 In this way, written rules of the game secured the formation of bridging social capital.
First, clear rules of the game secured a formalization of co-operation, which included the
possibility of sanction towards those members who violated the rules, all the peasants
had agreed upon (§9). In this way, any farmer who diluted the milk by adding water, used
wrong fodder for his cows, or in other ways tried to cheat the others would run the risk of
exclusion. 
The milk must be delivered to the dairy in a pure and non-adulterated condition.
Milk from sick cows must not be delivered (...). If it can be documented that the
milk delivered by a supplier has been adulterated, either by addition of water or
other mixtures,  or if  foamy milk is  delivered,  if  the milk of  sick cows has been
added, or if the pails are dirty – in such cases, the supplier is excluded from the
association and will be fined an amount of [etc.] [translated from Manøe Hansen,
1972, p. 34]. 
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Figure 3. Danish co-operative dairyworks 1882-90.
Source: Bjørn 1982, p. 85
47 Second,  as  farmers  got  used  to  following  the  clear,  written  rules  of  the  game,  the
formalized  framework  for  co-operation  became  “naturalized”,  that  is,  diffused  into
informal exchange as well. In this way, cooperation according to the rules of the game,
implying collective good provision, became a natural way of acting, normal behaviour
which the peasants did not even reflect upon anymore. The rules were internalized. They
became culture. 
 
Figure 4. Number of pupils in Danish rural folk high schools 1865-1900.
Source: Rørdam, 1983
48 Right from the beginning, this process was certainly not facilitated by the Danish state –
in fact  it  took place in spite of  the state.  So,  until  the end of  the 1880s,  the Danish
government – conservative and anti-socialist as it was – did nothing to encourage the
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foundation of co-operative dairies. On the contrary, both the state and the agricultural
organizations were often “downright negative” in their relation to the dairies (Bjørn
1982, p. 80). Consequently, the co-operative dairies were formed through a bottom-up
process, by local entrepreneurs primarily, and in accordance with the cultural traditions
and norms of the local community, that is, with a high degree of local embeddedness
(Bjørn, 1982, p. 119). As formerly had been the case with the wholesale companies, the
farmers financed their dairies themselves, making use of the local, parish savings banks,
just as they paid for all  professional assistance needed, if  unable to accomplish these
various tasks themselves (Bjørn, 1982, p. 100, see also Paldam and Svendsen, 2000). 
49 In this way, the outcome of entrepreneurial activities and the building of stocks of social
capital was first of all a significant increase in economic growth in former poor, rural
areas. Second, as has already been indicated, the outcome was a general “lubrication” of
mutual relations within the local communities, including cultural life. It is in this light we
should see the formation of a multitude of cultural institutions during the second half of
the 19th century, such as folk high schools, religious meeting- houses, drill-halls – all of
them  enhancing  the  accumulation  of  other  capitals  in  rural  Denmark  other  than
economic,  such as  human capital.  This  again strengthened the “recruitment” of  new
generations of  local  entrepreneurs providing collective goods and,  at  the same time,
carrying on the building of beneficial social capital.
50 This can be illustrated in the following way: 
 
Figure 5. The building of the beneficial social capital.
51 As  can  be  seen  in  figure  5,  this  development  was  initiated  by  innovations  in
organizational  structure  (“rules  of  the  game”),  acting  as  a  “kick-starter”  for  the
formation of  networks  of  associations  and stocks  of  beneficial  social  capital,  that  is,
bridging social  capital,  fostering local  entrepreneurs  all  over  the  country  to  provide
collective, non-excludable goods. Consequently,  this development was not only to the
profit of the single, local community but to the benefit of the whole nation. As showed in
the  figure,  this  again  contributed  to  the  accumulation  of  social  capital  and  the
recruitment of new generations of entrepreneurs, etc. 
 
Conclusion
52 The question we raised was why entrepreneurs arise and voluntarily organize larger
groups in local  areas.  This question was important because voluntary collective good
provision in a local area enhances economic growth and alleviates poverty. We argued
that a gap in economic literature exists. If the individual economic gain from providing a
collective good is negative, it does not pay an individual to act and organize. Still, larger
groups actually do organize in local areas even though the individual net gain is clearly
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negative. This paradox cannot be explained in strict economic terms. Thus, in an attempt
to fill out this gap in literature, we offered another solution to this paradox, namely the
presence  of  social  incentives  called  “social  capital”.  Regular  face-to-face  interaction
presumably encouraged co-operative relations among larger groups in local areas. Such
relations, we argued, would be initiated (kick-started) by innovations in organizational
structure in the form of clear, written rules of the game. 
53 This theoretical suggestion seemed to be confirmed by empirical evidence from rural
Denmark  1800-1900.  Here,  it  was  shown,  the  formalization  of  co-operation  included
sanctions,  most  prominently  exclusion from the group,  towards  those  members  who
violated the rules. Gradually, as farmers got used to follow the written rules of the game,
the formalized framework for co-operation became “naturalized”, that is, diffused into
informal exchange as well. In this way, co-operation according to the rules of the game,
implying collective good provision, became a natural way of acting, normal behaviour
which the peasants did not even reflect upon anymore. The rules were internalized and
turned into culture which again would further speed up the accumulation of beneficial
social capital (bridging social capital) and promote the recruitment of future generations
of  local  entrepreneurs.  In this  way,  a  good circle  of  social  capital  building would be
secured.  As  an  outcome  of  this  process,  entrepreneurs  provided  collective  goods,
contributing to economic growth and education in former poor, rural areas. 
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NOTES
1. We gratefully acknowledge the contributions from the other participants in the
ongoing World Bank project on social capital. In particular, we thank Martin Paldam,
Henrik Christoffersen, Ann-Marie Gabel and the financial support from the Danish Trust
Fund, as well as from the research program, “People in the Agrarian Landscape”, under
the cross disciplinary research initiative, “The Agrarian Landscape in Denmark
1998-2001”, financed by the Danish Research Counsels.
2. Strong social control in groups can lead to the production of negative social capital,
that is, network co-operation that is limiting the life possibilities of the members instead
of improving them. Drawing on empirical studies of immigrant groups in USA, this has
been documented by Portes (1998) and Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993). In his latest
book, Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam (2000) in a similar way talks about “bonding social
capital” in contrast to (positive) “bridging social capital”.
3. “The  profit  obtained  from  sale  [of  cheese  and  butter]  is  distributed  among  the
members in proportion to the amount of milk, each has delivered, minus the running
expenses of the dairy.  The profit from sale of butter is distributed monthly,  whereas
profit from sale of cheese is distributed once a year. Every day, buttermilk and whey is
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delivered back to the members in proportion to the amount of milk, each member has
delivered” (§1 of the founding statutes of Hjedding, translated from Manøe Hansen 1972,
p. 33).
4. With the exception of 10-15 percent of all Danish co-operative dairies, which voted
‘according to cows and not according to head’ (Bjørn 1982, p. 95). 
ABSTRACTS
Why do we find entrepreneurship within larger groups? This question has challenged the social
sciences since Olson (1965) showed that it does not pay an individual to provide collective goods
voluntarily, if the individual economic gain from doing this is negative. However, the fact that
larger groups actually do organize in local areas cannot be explained in strict economic terms. In
an attempt to fill this gap in literature, we offer another solution, namely the presence of social
incentives called “social capital”. Social capital is derived from regular face-to-face, co-operative
relations among larger groups in local areas. Such relations, we argue, are initiated by writing
down formal “rules of the game”, which are sanctioned effectively. This suggestion seems to be
confirmed by empirical  evidence from rural  Denmark 1800-1900.  During this  period,  written
rules in the form of the formal founding statutes of co-operative associations enhanced informal
peasant co-operation and stocks of beneficial social capital of an inclusive nature. As an outcome
of  this  process,  entrepreneurs  voluntarily  organized larger  groups which provided collective
goods locally, thus contributing to economic growth in former poor, rural areas. 
Pourquoi l’entrepreneuriat est-il présent au sein de groupes assez importants? Cette question a
posé problème aux sciences sociales depuis qu’Olson a montré, en 1965, qu’un individu n’a aucun
intérêt à fournir des biens collectifs volontairement, si le bénéfice économique individuel qu’il en
retire  est  négatif.  Toutefois,  le  fait  que  des  grands  groupes  s’organisent  localement  ne  peut
s’expliquer au sens strictement économique.  Dans un effort  pour combler cette lacune,  nous
offrons  une autre  solution,  qui  est  l’existence d’incitants  sociaux appelés  “capital  social”.  Le
capital social provient d’un face-à-face régulier et de relations de coopération parmi des groupes
assez larges à l’échelle locale. Nous soutenons que de telles relations se forment en consignant
par écrit des “règles du jeu” formelles, qui sont effectivement sanctionnées. Notre suggestion
semble confirmée par la preuve empirique que représente le Danemark rural de 1800-1900. Au
cours  de  cette  période,  les  règles  écrites  sous  forme  de  statuts  fondateurs  officiels  des
coopératives ont renforcé la coopération paysanne informelle et les réserves en capital social
positif, de nature inclusive. Par conséquent, les entrepreneurs ont organisé de façon délibérée
des  groupes  assez  importants,  qui  ont  fourni  des  biens  collectifs  localement,  et  ont  ainsi
contribué à la croissance économique dans des zones rurales auparavant défavorisées.
INDEX
Keywords: social capital, entrepreneurship, rural poverty, formal and informal rules
Mots-clés: capital social, entrepreneuriat, pauvreté rurale, règles formelles et informelles
Alleviating poverty: entrepreneurship and social capital in rural Denmark 180...




PhD student, Danish Institute of Border Region Studies, Aabenraa (Denmark), gs@ifg.dk
GERT TINGGAARD SVENDSEN
Associate professor, PhD, Department of Economics, Aarhus School of Business (Denmark), 
gts@asb.dk
Alleviating poverty: entrepreneurship and social capital in rural Denmark 180...
Belgeo, 3 | 2001
19
